Many institutional arrangements suggest that punishments and rewards each play a separate role in providing incentives. In New York City's recent negotiations with its teacher's union, for instance, the city sought a contract that would strengthen school principals' ability to assign teachers to be cafeteria monitors, in part because this allows them to punish underperforming teachers. The contract also includes rewards for teachers with good performance. Another example is that some universities now use a combination of raises and differential teaching loads to encourage good performance. Similarly, procurement and production contracts and government regulations in areas ranging from meat inspection to sulphur dioxide pollution often include both bonuses for good performance and various sorts of clawbacks for bad.
secretaries may perform more promptly for those who are polite or bring gifts and less promptly or poorly for those who are rude or unfriendly. Absent complete contracts, voluntary punishments and rewards are the mechanisms we use to sustain cooperation. Understanding what triggers the demands for each and their effectiveness may help us understand informal relations and to design institutions that can harness cooperation and improve social welfare.
The objective of this paper is to begin a systematic look at both punishments and rewards in economic laboratory experiments.1 Experimental studies have demonstrated substantial demands for both punishments and rewards.2 In one-shot proposer-responder games people are willing to sacrifice personal payoffs to punish those who are unkind, and reward those who are kind. These studies typically examine either rewards or punishments, but not both.3 Thus they make it difficult to determine what motivates these demands, how they interact, or how they affect cooperation. We examine punishments and rewards both separately and jointly. We study a series of two-person proposer-responder games with costly punishments and rewards. Proposers choose how much to share of a fixed pie. Responders are in one of four conditions: punish or reward, reward only, punish only, or neither. By considering two-person games we avoid freeriding on punishments by others, and by randomly changing partners we avoid any repeated game effects. By looking at rewards and punishments both separately and jointly we can identify any interaction or complementarity.
We find substantial demands for both rewards and punishments. As expected, an increase in the offer by proposers, on average, decreases the punishment and increases the reward. Interestingly, while the average demand for punishment appears to be independent of the reward option, we find that the demand for rewards is significantly larger when the responder doesn't have the option of punishing. This suggests that the ideals subjects try to enforce may be affected by the tools they have available. We also find that, on average, the proposed offer is largest when a combination of rewards and punishments are available, and smallest when neither option is available. Although the average offer of the rewards-only treatment exceeds that of punishments-only, we find that rewards are much less effective in moving the proposers away from the minimum possible offer. Thus one might expect less cooperation in societies where good behavior is rewarded than in those where poor behavior is punished. Designing an institution around rewards only and omitting an option for punishments may be a mistake, even if in the end punishments are rarely used. The set of payoff combinations that are available in the Carrot-Stick game is illustrated in Figure 1 . The proposer's payoff is measured on the horizontal axis and the responder's payoff 4 For identification purposes we wanted the cost of punishments and rewards to be independent of the offer. This is not the case in the ultimatum game nor in Fehr and Gachter (2000) where a larger offer increases both the perceived generosity and the cost of punishing. While there are cases where the cost of say a $1 reward is $1, there are many others where the cost versus consequence of rewards and punishments is not one-for-one. For example, the cost of complaining over bad service in a restaurant is likely to be much smaller than the consequences imposed on the waiter; similarly the cost of praise may be smaller than the benefit. As the objective of this study is to examine the interaction between rewards and punishments we chose a cost-consequence ratio where we expected to observe both. on the vertical axis. The proposer chooses an offer along the bold solid line, and conditional on that offer the responder has the option of choosing any point on the reward and punishment lines originating at the proposer's offer. These choices are indicated by the lighter solid lines. To secure the responder the opportunity of decreasing the proposer's payoff to zero, we do not allow the proposer to make offers below 40 cents. The dashed portion of the bold line shows the proposals excluded by this rule.
The 45? line, shown with light dashes, indicates the possible payoff combinations that result in equal payoffs to the responder and proposer. While the responder decreases her payoff by choosing any outcome off of the bold line, note that moves into areas I and III result in a more equal distribution of payoffs than under the original proposal. In contrast, subjects who pick outcomes in areas II and IV could have chosen an outcome which both resulted in a larger personal payoff as well as a more equal distribution of payoffs.
The feasible payoff combinations in the Carrot treatment include all points on or to the right of the bold line, the Stick treatment include points on or to the left of the bold line, while the Dictator treatment only includes points on the bold line. If it is common knowledge that all individuals seek to maximize their personal payoff, then the subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome is the same for all treatments. The responder should neither reward nor punish, and given this response the proposer should choose the minimum required transfer of 40 cents.
We conducted three sessions of each treatment, each with ten proposers and ten responders, for a total of 30 subjects in each role in each treatment. Subjects were undergraduate business students and were randomly assigned to a treatment. Upon arriving to the experiment they were randomly assigned to a computer terminal and were given a set of written instructions. The experimenter read the instructions aloud, after which the subjects were asked to calculate the payoffs in a specific example of the game. The answers to the quiz were collected, and the example was reviewed verbally by the experimenter. Half of the subjects were then randomly assigned to be proposers and half to be responders. They remained in that role throughout the experiment.
Subjects played ten iterations of the game. In each iteration subjects were randomly and anonymously paired, with the stipulation that no two subjects met more than once. Subjects' identities were never revealed to one another. Subjects' earnings for all ten rounds were tallied and added to a $5 show-up payment. While waiting for their payment, subjects answered a questionnaire. They were paid anonymously with cash in envelopes which were handed out by subject number. The experiment typically lasted less than an hour, and including the show-up fee the average earnings were $17.41 (standard deviation of $4.80, maximum of $49.35, and minimum of $6.70).5 The instructions were kept as neutral as possible by referring to the punishments and rewards simply as changes to the proposer's payoff. A copy of the instructions is available from the authors.
II. Results
We first examine whether the observed behavior is consistent with the standard subgameperfect equilibrium prediction. Next we examine how the responder's options affect the cooperative behavior of the proposer, and discuss the demands for rewards and punishments. Next we turn to the responders' decisions. Here we find statistically significant evidence of both punishments and rewards.8 In fact the willingness to reward and punish is substantial. Across the three treatments responders changed the proposer's payoff 43 percent of the time, and over the ten rounds 80 percent of the responders chose to make at least one change of the proposer's payoff. During the last five rounds, 75 percent of the responders changed the proposer's payoff. Figure 3 shows the proportion of offers that were either increased or decreased by the responder in a given round.9 Once again we observe differences across treatments. During the last five rounds the average responder in the Differences are significant at the 5-percent level for the ten rounds, at the 10-percent level for the last five rounds, and with exception of the Dictator-Stick comparison at the 10-percent level for the last round.
A. Equilibrium Predictions
8 For all three treatments we reject the hypothesis that rewards and/or punishments are zero. Treating each responder as an observation we test if responders on average chose not to change the proposer's payoff. Over the ten rounds the t-statistic is 4.6 for Carrot, 7.5 for Carrot-Stick, and 5.9 for Stick. The results for the last round and the last five rounds are similar. 14 We use a conservative approach to labeling observations as censored when testing if the demand for punishment depend on the availability of rewards. We denote any observation that results in zero payoffs to the proposer, and any observation where the responder chose not to change the proposer's payoffs as censored. Using a random-effects model for censored data we regress the truncated demand for punishments on the offer, a dummy for the Stick treatment, and an interaction between the two, and account for censoring as described above. Looking across all ten rounds, or just the last five rounds, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the demands for punishments are the same across treatments. As expected an increase in the proposer's offer significantly decreases punishments. 15 Counting each responder as an observation we test if the option of rewarding increases average punishments of low offers. Across the last five rounds the p-value of the test is 0.21, and for the last round the p-value is 0.10. Note that in each of the last five rounds the punishment of low offers exceeds that observed in the absence of rewards.
16 Such choices cannot be revealed in the trust game, where all transfers result in the responder receiving more than half the pie (Berg et al., 1995) . Note that the costconsequence ratio is one-for-three in the trust game. Even for very large offers, where we know there is no demand for punishment, we see that the absence of the ability to punish results in substantially larger average rewards. While punishments are unaffected by the availability of rewards, we find that the rewards are larger when there is no option of punishing. It is the combination of these results that makes them puzzling. If one were presented simply with the reward results, then it is tempting to argue that the difference is caused by a simple substitution effect. If rewards and punishments are viewed as substitutes in enforcing a certain level of proposer kindness, then the demand for either one may be decreasing in own cost and 17 To determine if the responders' demands for rewards change when punishments are available, we take a conservative approach to labeling observations as censored. We denote any observation that results in zero payoffs to the responder, and any observation where the responder chose not to change the proposer's payoffs as censored. Using a random-effects model we regress the truncated demand for rewards on the offer, a dummy for the Carrot treatment, and an interaction term between the two, and account for censoring as described above. The joint hypothesis that there is no effect from the punishment option is rejected with a p-value of 0.04 over the ten rounds, and 0.03 over the last five rounds. As expected an increase in the proposer's offer significantly increases rewards. increasing in the cost of the other input. If the ideal is the same across treatments, then excluding one of these substitutable tools simply suggests that rewards should be larger in the Carrot than in the Carrot-Stick treatment. If subjects are limited to only using one of two tools, then they may use the available tool more. In contrast to our experimental evidence, this also implies that the demands for punishments will be larger in the Stick than in the Carrot-Stick treatment. Therefore a simple substitution argument cannot explain the combined results.
To better understand what motivates rewards and punishments we examine the distribution of final payoffs in the Carrot, Stick, and CarrotStick treatments. Based on these payoff distributions what can we conclude about the motive for punishments and rewards? It is clear that responders do not simply aim at equalizing payoffs, otherwise they should not be choosing outcomes that decrease both their absolute and relative payoffs, nor should rewards be larger in the absence of punishments.19 Rather our results may suggest that the ideals enforced by responders depend on the tools they have available.2? Specifically it appears that proposers in the Carrot-Stick treatment are held to a higher standard than those in the other treatments. In the Carrot-Stick treatment the offers first-order stochastically dominate those of the other treatments. Thus, for any given offer a larger fraction of offers exceed that offer in the Carrot-Stick game than in any of the other games. As a result, the same offer may be seen as less generous in the Carrot-Stick treatment than if it were made in the Carrot or Stick treatment. All else equal, this would result in smaller rewards and larger punishments in the Carrot-Stick treatment. Combined with the substitutability arguments, two opposing factors may be affecting the average demand for punishments. On one hand the absence of rewards may cause a substitution towards the punishment option, and on the other hand the lack of rewards may imply that a given offer is perceived as being more generous, suggesting less punishment. In contrast, both of these effects suggest larger rewards when there is no punishment option. Our findings are consistent with both of these effects.
III. Conclusion
We have examined demands for rewards and punishments and their effects on cooperation. . 20 The reciprocity models by Matthew Rabin (1993) and Martin Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (1998) cannot account for these differences in demands. The reason is that they predict that the kindness associated with a particular offer is independent of the availability of rewards or punishments. We considered a simple proposer-responder environment with randomly rematched partners. In this way, our experiment allowed us to concentrate on the pure demands for rewards and punishments. By considering four conditionspunish or reward, reward only, punish only, and neither-we can identify the effect each has separately and jointly.
We find, first, and perhaps surprisingly, that rewards alone are relatively ineffective in moving the modal offer away from the most selfish one possible. Second, punishments improved cooperation by eliminating extremely selfish offers, pushing proposers in the Stick treatment to modest degrees of cooperation. Combining rewards and punishments had a very strong effect. In the Carrot-Stick treatment the modal offer was the most generous one possible, often leading to rewards by responders. Even though generous offers were not punished, such generosity was only reached when the threat of punishments existed. This indicates that rewards and punishments act to complement one another.
In addition to this, we also found some surprising treatment effects in the responders' choices. While demands for punishments are unaffected by the availability of a reward option, we found that rewards are larger when there is no option of punishing. The combination of these two findings is quite puzzling. An explanation may require a definition of kindness that changes by treatment. Given the distribution of offers it may be that a particular offer is perceived as less kind in the Carrot-Stick treatment than in the other treatments. This suggests that the two tools are not merely substitutes in enforcing a fixed objective, but rather that their availability alters the ideals that they enforce. Thus, compared to punishment-only institutions we may observe harsher conditional punishments when rewards are also available.
Finally, what do our results suggest about how these voluntary demands shape economic institutions? While more work clearly needs to be done, cooperation in our experiment is most successfully enforced in an environment in which both punishments and rewards are available. The process suggested by our data is that the stick can help by getting people to move away from perfect selfishness and to test the waters of cooperation. The carrot can then take over by encouraging further cooperation, rendering the stick a rarely used but necessary tool. Our results show that when devising incentive systems it is important to recognize that in some environments the absence of a reward is not equivalent to a punishment-it is important that both tools be present.
